Prepaid Dental Services, Inc v. Roger C. Day, Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Utah : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Prepaid Dental Services, Inc v. Roger C. Day,
Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Utah :
Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
JOHN PRESTON CREER, DAVID F. EVANS; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant;WILLIAM G.
GIBBS; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Prepaid Dental Services v. Day, No. 16826 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2046
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
PREPAID D~NTAL SERVICES, I~C., ) 
a Utah Corporation, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
ROGE.R c. DAY, Commissioner of 
- Insurance of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendant-Respondent 
) 
) 
) 
) 
} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 16826 
--~----------~-----~~~-----> 
REPLY BRIEF 
AN APPEAL FROM THE DECISION AND ORDER OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SAL.T LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
'!'HE HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
\ 
JOHN PRESTON CREER 
DAVID F. EVANS 
"SENIOR & SENIOR 
1100 Benef ic1al Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
WILLIAM. G. GIB.BS 
Special Assistant Atto.rney c;.enera 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lak~ City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent 
e_._·· .. "··.· . r_, . E· .. =.-~... n u-·· u tL_ _ ltJ 
Pr: In_ ·R 0 '"i .1° .. · 8· ·o· ·. 
. :\ • (,.; ' "J . . 
~p·~·~ ...... -""1'"'--·"-"' ....... ~ ...... :-.:.,..,.' 
;Cfor.!~, ~-.,~rein!> 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
PREPAID DENTAL SERVICES, INC., ) 
a Utah Corporation, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
ROGER C. DAY, Commissioner of 
Insurance of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendant-Respondent 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 16826 
~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
REPLY BRIEF 
AN APPEAL FROM THE DECISION AND ORDER OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
JOHN PRESTON CREER 
DAVID F. EVANS 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
WILLIAM G. GIBBS 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. Nature of the Case......................... 1 
II. Disposition of the Case in Lower Court .. ~. l. 
III. Nature of Relief Sought on Appeal........ 1 
IV. Statement of Facts........................ 1 
v. Argument................................... 2 
A. The Plan Proposed is Insurance........ 2 
1. The obligations of PDS are a. 
"Benefit" under the statute....... 3 
2. Cited cases are not analogous..... 7 
(a) Group Health Association was 
a "not for profit" corp....... 7 
(b) Jordan Court "over-reached" to 
find socially desirable result 9 
(c) Special legislation has met 
Jordan's socially desirable 
result........................ 10 
(d) Different Statutory Definitions 11 
(e) PDS has created more assumption 
of risk than Jordan........... 11 
3. Case Law confirms Plan is insurance 12 
B. The Proposed Plan Falls Under the 
Health Maintenance Organization Act... 12 
C. Insurance Conunissioner's Expertise.... 14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases Cited 
In Re Clark's Estate, 10 Utah 2d 427, 364 P.2d 
190 (1965) ................................. ·.... 4 
Cleveland Hospital Service Corporation v 
Ebright, 45 NE 2d 157 (Ohio) affd. 49 NE 929. 12 
Ftshb~ck v Universal Service Agency, 151 P.768 
(Wash. 1915)................................. 8 
Jordan v Group Health Association, 107 F.2d 239 
(1939) ...... "!································ 7 McCarty v King· County Medical Service Corp., 
175 P. 2d 653 (Wash. 1946) .....•...•. · ... ~..... 8 
People v California Mutual Association, 441 P.2d 
97 (Cal. 1068)............................... 12 
Utah Funeral Directors & Embalmers v Memorial 
Gardens., 17 Utah 2d 227, 408 P.2d 190 (1965). 4 
Statutes Cited 
31-1-7, UCA, 1953 as amended. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . • . . 4 
31-42-1, UCA, 1953, as amended................. 3 
31-42-2, UCA, 1953, as amended..... . . . • . . . . . . . . 14 
31-42-3(4), (5), UCA, 1953, as amended......... 12 
31-42-3 (6), UCA, 1953, as amended.............. 13 
31-42-4, UCA, 1953, as amended................. 13 
31-41-1, UCA, 1953, as amended................. 10 
31-42-1, UCA, 1953, as amended................. 10 
31-42-6(2) UCA, 1953, as amended............... 13 
Authorities Cited 
2 AmJur 2d 519, §656, Administrative Law....... 14 
Keeton, Robert E., Insurance Law Basic Text, 
(West. Pub. 1971, at 547) ...•........•..•••.. 9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this case, Prepaid Dental Services, Inc., Appellant 
herein, petitioned the court below for a Declaratory Judgment 
declaring that the Findings and Order of Roger c. Day, 
Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Utah, herein 
Respondent, were inconsistent with the definition of "Insur-
ance" as set forth in Section 31-1-7 of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) and the definition of a "Health Maintenance Organiza-
tion" within the provisions of Title 21, Chapter 42, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953). 
II. DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The court below issued a Memorandum Opinion which sus-
tained the Findings and Order of the Insurance Department 
and dismissed Appellant's Pet~tion. 
III. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the decision of the 
lower court which sustained the Findings and Order of the 
Insurance Commissioner. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Respondent stipulated to the facts in this 
case, and the Appellant has set forth in his Statement of 
Facts the verbatim wording of the stipulation, with which 
Respondent, of course, agrees. Appellant additionally 
stated that the trial court took no "additional evidence." 
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The trial court did, in fact, admit a certified copy of 
the Appellant's Articles of Incorporation showing that it 
was a "for profit" corporation (R. 248, ·Exp. lP). There 
is no dispute on this point. Respondent otherwise agrees 
with the concluding paragraphs of Appellant's Statement of 
Facts which are not quoted from the stipulation. 
The trial court, in its Memorandum Opinion summarized 
briefly and clearly the undisputed fact situation. 
·"The Plaintiff requires the dentists to render 
" .•. services described in Exhibit 'A' attached hereto 
and incorporated herein by reference, at no·charge 
to such Participant or Employer Group other than the 
monthly charge then in effect •.. " (Ex. A par. 
Eighth). Furthermore, the dentists ihall provide 
a "performance bond" such that if the dentist ... "fails 
to perform the required services for any reason, the 
bonding company will pay such other licensed dentist 
as may be designated by the Participant to perform 
the services ... " (Ex. A par. Twelfth). The 
substance of the transaction therefore calls for·the 
employer to pay to the Plaintiff a monthly charge 
for each participant and in exchange for this the 
Plaintiff agrees to use its "best efforts" to obtain 
lidensed dentists to render professional services as 
scheduled. On the other half of the transaction, 
the Plaintiff enters into a contract with dentists 
who agree to perform the scheduled service.s for an 
agreed monthly sum and to furnish a performance bond 
to guarantee the participant that if the dentist fails 
to " •.. perform the required services for any reason ... " 
the bonding company will pay such other licensed 
dentists to perform the services as the Participant 
may designate." (R. 251) 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE PLAN PROPOSED IS INSURANCE. 
The trial court, in its Memorandum Opinion, stated the 
issues in this case in clear terms: 
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"The question before this court is whether or not the 
program outlined in the Stipulated Statement of Facts 
constitutes "insurance" and if it does, then does it 
qualify under the "Health Maintenance Organization 
Act." (31-42-1, et seq.) 
The basic question is whether or not this program 
constitutes "insurance." The Defendant contends that 
when you look at the total program it constitutes a 
contract whereby " ... one undertakes to ... allow a ... 
benefit upon determinable risk contingencies." 
(31-1-7) Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that 
the documents attached to the Stipulated Statement 
of Facts show (1) that the dentists are independent 
contractors (Ex. D Par. 9.01) arid (2) that Plaintiff 
is only obligated to use its "best efforts" in ob-
taining and providing dental services (Ex. D Par. 
2.02 and 2.03). Exhibit "C" is the Master Contract 
and except for the "best efforts" provisions it 
certainly has all the provisions and language of a 
group insurance policy coverage." (R.250). 
1. The obligations of PDS are a nBenefit" under the 
Statute. 
Were it not for the "best efforts" mechanism used by 
Plaintiff, not even Plaintiff would question that the plan 
devised by the Plaintiff would be considered insurance under 
our Insurance Code. Plaintiff admits in its brief that 
"under the plan proposed by PDS there is a risk" and does 
not seriously dispute that "there is a distribution of risk 
under the Prepaid Dental Plan." (Plaintiff's brief Pel0,11). 
Plaintiff's claim is that the "basic insurance equation 
fails in that PDS does not assume that r~sk." {Plaintiff's 
brief p.11). The heart of Plaintiff's defense then, is· 
that the mechanism of "best efforts" negates an "assumption 
of the risk" by Plaintiff. 
The position the Commissioner of Insurance took and 
that which the trial court took was that the use of "best 
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efforts" was a "benefit" which falls squarely within the 
statutory definition of insurance as a "contract whereby 
... one undertakes to ... allow a benefit upon determinable 
risk contingencies." (31-1-7 UCA) . 
As noted in Utah Funeral Directors & Embalmers v 
Memorial Gardens, 17 Utah 2d 227, 408 P.2d 190 (1965), 
after Justice Crockett wrote his opinion in the In re Clark's 
Estate, 10 Utah 2d 427, 354 P.2d 112 (1960), the Legislature 
amended the statutory def ini.tion of insurance so as to 
adopt and codify the court's conclusions. The statute now 
expresses, as clearly and completely as the Legislature 
is able to do so, the cu~rent definition of insurance under 
Utah law. 
It is common knowledge that in many insurance contracts, 
the assumption of risk by the insurer is not for the total 
.risk exposure. of the insured. In a life insurance policy, 
the.insurer assumes a fixed dollar risk which may be as 
low as a hundred dollars or as high as millions of dollars. 
The insurer does not agree to equate that which it does 
in providing a benefit with the total loss to the insured. 
The insurer simply "allows" the "benefit" contracted under 
the terms of the policy. Not even Plaintiff would claim 
that a $100 insurance policy covers the total loss to an 
insured in a matured life insurance policy. The $100, 
however, ·is the "benefit" under the statute that is 
"allowed upon a determinable risk contingency." The same 
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situation applies in an automobile insurance policy. Such 
a policy may be purchased for a liability coverage of 
$100 or $1~0,000,000. There may be deductibles in the 
policy contract~ In any of these cases, it is not necessary 
that the policy insure the entire risk to which the insured 
is exposed in order for the policy to be an insurance policy 
under our Insurance Code definition. It is only necessary 
that the insurer "undertake to allow a benefit upon a deter-
minable risk contingency." The same categorization also· 
applies to a fire insurance policy or other casualty insur-
ance policy. A building may be insured against fire for 
much less than its value and a high deductible may be part 
of the terms of the policy. Whatever the agreed benefit, 
however, it is triggered upon the happening of the deter-
minable risk contingency, i.e. the occurrence of a fire 
which does damage to the insured's structure. Further 
examples could be given from the health insurance field or 
any other insurance field to show that the benefit does 
not have to be co-equal with the amount of the damage at 
risk. Had the legislature intended that the entire damage 
be covered in ·order to have such a contract defined as an 
insurance policy under the statutory definition of insurance, 
the legislature certainly could have used a word other than 
"benefit". Webster's Third International Dictionary defines 
benefit as: 
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"3. Whatever promotes welfarei advantage; profit." 
The undertaking of the Plaintiff to use its "best 
efforts" to obtain the services of dentists under contract 
to Plaintiff to provide the contracted care is certainly 
a "benefit" as defined by Webster. 
The performance bond contracted by PDS to be furnished 
provides an additional "benefit" to the participant or 
policy holder. A recitation from page 12 of Plaintiff's 
brief makes clear what this obligation intends: 
" ... the Dental Group must provide a performance bond 
in an amount equal to the estimated annual payment 
due from each Employer Group. The terms of such 
performance bond provide that in the ·event the Dental 
Group fails for any reason to perform the required 
services, the 'bonding company will pay such other 
licensed dentist as may be designated by the Parti-
cipant to perform the specific dental services des-
cribed in the Dental Group Agreement. Thus, if the 
Dental Group failed for any reason to perform any 
of the specified dental services the Participant would 
rely on the performance bond to. have those services 
performed by another ... " 
Plaintiff claims because the performance bond is written 
by a licensed and regulated insurer, that the "risk is 
assumed" by the dental group's performance bond carrier 
and not by PDS. 
The benefit which PDS provides to the policy.holder 
is the agreement that the performance bond will be provided. 
PDS binds itself by contract to the dentists to enable PDS 
to provide the necessa~y services to the policy holders. 
PDS then further binds the dentists by contract that the 
dentists provide a performance bond. The initial performance 
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of the "best efforts" of PDS, then of the dentists, and 
finally of the performance bond, is all triggered by my 
toothache. The fact that PDS by contract provides that 
others shall furnish the benefit, does not relieve PDS 
of providing that which it agrees to do under the contract. 
The trial court found the contract between PDS and the 
dentist pool to be a third party beneficiary contract 
running in favor of the participants. These are the "bene-
fits" that make. the contract one of insurance under the 
statutory· definition. 
2. Cited cases are not analogous. 
The lynch pin of Plaintiff's argument is the more than 
40 year old Jordan v Group Health Association case, 107 
F.2d 239 {1939) and its progeny. The Jordan case is clearly 
distinguishable on at least 5 critical points. 
(a) Group Health Association was a "not for prof it" 
·corporation. Plaintiff obviously understands this critical 
difference because on page 10 of his brief, he tries 
unsuccessfully to shoe-horn the PDS fact situation into 
the Jordan fact situation by categorizing the relationship 
of the participants in PDS as follows: 
" •.• however, a more accurate description woul~ be the 
joining together of a number of persons who will need 
dental care in order to obtain a discount price for 
such dental care." 
Although the description is close to the fact situation in 
Jordan, it is not the fact situation of PDS. Jordan 
dealt with a non-profit consumer cooperative association 
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incorporated as a non-profit corporation under Washington, 
D.C. law. Control of the association was in trustees who 
served without compensation. The very idea of the consumer 
cooperative was that the consumers - members of the associa-
tion - band together for their mutual benefit in obtaining 
medical services at."wholesale prices." PDS makes no 
claims to being a not-for-profit corporation or association. 
It intends to market dental care based on need for a profit. 
The reasoning of the Jordan case is not applicable in a 
"for profit" situation because it changes the basic purpose 
of the association. In Jordan, at least a claim could be 
made that the dominant feature was a non-prof it service 
contract. This is not true with PDS. The Fishback v 
Universal Service Agency.case, 151 P.768 (Wash. 1915) cited 
b: 7 Plaintiff is also distinguishable on this ground. The 
distinction is discussed in cases following Jordan. 
A plan similar to that proposed by PDS was held to be 
insurance in McCarty v King County Medical Service Corp., 
175 P.2d 653 (Wash. 1946). In this case, the service corpora-
ti'on had contracts with certain physicians and hospitals, 
by which they agreed to treat all members of the corpora-
tion's plan. In holding the plan to be insurance, the court 
distinguished the plan from similar plans held not to be 
insurance in Jordan and an earlier Washington case, Fishback, 
which was relied on in Jordan. Jordan was characterized 
as a consumer cooperative, not for profit. The McCarty 
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plan, on the other hand, was described as a " ... private 
corporation, a distinct entity in the eyes of the law, 
dealing with employee beneficiaries on the one hand, and 
with physicians and hospitals on the other." 175 P.2d at 
662. The court also pointed out-that the service corpora-
tion had full authority to determine the eligibility of any 
employee applicant. In the Jordan plan, the service 
corporation was characterized as an agent for the physicians, 
but the court in McCarty declared the service corporation 
to have such control as to be the moving spirit in the 
business, and therefore declared the corporation to be the 
principal. 
(b) Jordan Court "over-reached" to find socially 
desirable result. In analyzing the Jordan case, the eminent 
insurance authority, Professor Keeton, has commented: 
"Although the arrangement challenged in Jordan was well 
conceived to minimize or subordinate the elements of 
risk transference and distribution through the asso-
ciation, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
the decision was influenced by an appraisal of the 
arrangement as socially useful and as giving rise 
to less urgent need for public regulation than ordinary 
insurance arrangements." Insurance Law Basic Text, 
Keeton, Robert E. (West Pub. 1971 at 547). 
In a note in the Harvard Law Review shortly after the 
Jordan decision was reached, the commentator concluded 
similarly to Professor Keeton: 
"In the absence of special legislation it would seem 
wiser to treat the plans as insurance, but of a type 
not intended to be required by the statutes." 52 
Harv. L.R. 809,815. 
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As· stated in Keeton's Insurance Law Basic.Text at 
549, the trend today is toward just such special legislation. 
(c) Special legislation has met Jordan's socially 
.desirable result. Special regulatory statutes have been 
enacted for me~ical and health associations in most states, 
.sq as to prevent the courts from having to struggle with 
wheth.e.r general -insurance statutes are applicable to plans 
of this type. In Utah, our legislature has established 
two methods of allowing the resuits thought socially desirable 
in Jordan by declaring such a. plan insurance but providing 
for a minimum of regulation. The Non-Profit Servic~ Corpora-
tion Act, 31-41-1 et seq. UCA and Health Maintenance Organ-
ization Act, 31-42-1 et seq. UCA, specifically allow organ-
izations similar to that proposed by Plaintiff to operate 
outside the scope of the general insurance laws but still 
under minimum needed regulation. 
If the Plaintiff in this case wants to reincorporate 
as a non-profit corporation, as was the case in Jordan, 
and the other cases cited as being controlling by Plaintiff 
in its brief, it could be granted a Certificate of Authority 
by the Commissioner under Chapter 37 of the Insurance Code. 
Several similar dental plans are already operating in the 
State under the provisions of this Act. Both Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield operate under the provisions of this Act 
and it seems obvious that the legislature intended to meet 
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the socially desirable.goals that the Washington court. met 
in Jordan, supra, by providing a statutory method for doing 
so under much less stringent regulations. 
(d) Different Statutory Definitions. The Washing-
ton D.C. statutory definition of insurance under which the 
Jordan and Fishback cases were decided, is more limited 
than the Utah definition of insurance. The Washington 
statute required "payment of indemnity" (Jordan, supra,. 
page 244). The Utah definition as repeatedly pointed out 
provides only that a benefit be allowed. (31-1-7 UCA.) 
This broad difference is crucial. 
(e) PDS has created more assumption of risk than 
Jordan. The trial court in its memorandum decision express-
es this distinguishing feature between Jordan and PDS 
succinctly (R.251). 
"Courts will look to substance rather than form and 
an obvious examination of this transaction shows that 
Plaintiff is spreadi~g the risk upon determinable 
contingencies. Plaintiff cites Jordan v Group Health 
Association, 107 F.2d 239 (1939) and Fishback v Uni-
versal Service Agency, 151 P.758 (Wash. 1915). These 
cases are distinguishable in that the plaintiff in 
this case not only says it will use its "best efforts" 
as set forth in those cases but goes one step further 
and requires the dentist to file a "performance bond" 
thus eliminating one element. In Jordan the court said 
" ... insurance also, by the better view, involves 
distribution of the risk, but distribution without 
assumption hardly can be held to be insurance." . 
(107 F.2d at 245, emphasis added). Although the 
plaintiff says it has not directly assumed the risk, 
it nevertheless has contracted to cover it by Exhibit 
B and the performance bond. Participants are third 
party beneficiaries of that contract. 
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3. Case Law confirms Plan is Insurance. 
In addition to the McCarty case discussed above, the 
Ohio court and the California court have considered similar 
plans and determined them to be insurance. 
Cleveland Hospital Service Corporation v Ebright, 
45 NE 2d 157 (Ohio) affd. 49 NE 929, held such a plan to be 
insurance because, among other things, although non-profit, 
they used actuarial data to compute their premium schedule, 
and therefore were actually insuring the risk rather than 
providing a service. 
People v California Mutual Association, 441 P.2d 97 
(Cal. 1068) held a similar plan to be insurance because 
indemnity was a substantial financial proportion of the 
business. PDS is basing its premium schedule on actuarial 
data, and, as has already been discussed, a substantial 
financial proportion of its business is indemnification of 
the participants. 
B. THE PROPOSED PLAN FALLS UNDER THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE 
ORGANIZATION ACT. 
PDS falls within the scope of the general type of 
plan intended to be gov~rned by Utah's Health Maintenance 
Organization Act. All underlining in quoted material is 
mine. 
Sections 31-42-3(4) and (5) state: 
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"(4) "Health maintenance organization" means any 
person: 
(a) Who furnishes, either directly or _through 
arrangements with others, health care to an enrolled 
member in return for periodic payments; the amount~ 
of said payments are agreed upon prior to the time 
during which the health care may be furnished; and 
(b) Who is obligated to the member to arrange for 
or to directly provide available and accessible 
health care. 
(5) "Health care" means any of the following or any 
combination thereof; Professional or personal services, 
facilities, equipment, devices, supplies, medicine, 
etc. intended for use in the diagnosis, treatment, 
mitigation or prevention of any human ailment or 
impairment." 
This section declares precisely what PDS proposes to do -
arrange for health care to enrolled members in return for 
periodic payments. 
Section 31-42-4 states: 
"No person may operate a health maintenance organiza-
tion within the ?tate of Utah without obtaining a 
certificate of authority from the Commissioner." 
Section 31-42-6(2) sets forth the conditions that must be 
met in order to qualify for a certificate of authority and 
subsection (c) thereof states that: 
" ..• the commissioner must be satisfied that the health 
care plan constitutes an appropriate mechanism whereby 
the applicant would effectively provide or arrange for 
a provision of basic health care services on a pre-
paid basis, through insurance or otherwise ... " 
Section 31-42-3(6) defines basic health care as: 
" .•. as a minimum, emergency care, inpatient hospital 
and physician care, outpatient medical services, 
and out-of-area coverage." 
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PDS does not meet the requirement of providing basic 
health care. 
Section 31-42-2 states as an introduction to the act: 
"As a guide to the interpretation and application of 
this act, the public policy of this state is declared 
to be as follows: The legislature wishes·to eliminate 
legal barriers to the establishment of health main-
tenance organizations which provide readily available, 
accessible and quality comprehensive health care to 
their members and to encourage.their development as an 
.alternative method of health care delivery. The 
state of Utah must have reasonable assurance that 
health maintenance organizations offering health plans 
within this state are financially and administratively 
sound and that such organizations are in fact able to 
deliver the benefits which they offer." 
PDS is the type of plan intended to be goverhed by 
Utah's Health Maintenance Organization Act. However, PDS 
fails to qualify for a certificate of authority because·it 
does not provide "comprehensive" health care or "basic 
health care" as defined by Sections 31-42-2 or 31-42-3(6) 
UCA. 
C. INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S EXPERTISE. 
The weight of authority suggests that the reviewing 
court in deciding questions as to the proper interpretation 
and application of a statute, may properly attach.weight, 
or great weight, to the decision of such question by an 
administrative -agency having special competence to deal 
with the subject, in line with the general principle that 
courts will give great weight to the administrative 
construction of a statute (2 AmJur 2d 519), Administrative 
Law, §656). In this case, the Commissioner of Insurance 
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initially heard the claim of Plaintiff and thereafter 
. issued comprehensive Findings and an Order which demonstrate 
the ~xpertise of the Insurance Commissioner in understanding 
the specific claim of Plaintiff as well as his ability to 
relate the results of a decision to the possible problems 
that may flow in its wake. The Commissioner made the follow-
ing Findings and Order which we submit is an appropriate 
result for this Court to reach: 
"Findings: 
1. The Petitioner proposes to contract with "employer 
groups" to arrange for certain specific services 
related to dental care to be provided to "participating 
employees" of employer groups for a set monthly fee per 
participating employee. Such an arrangement is tradi-
tionally thought of as a "direct service" contract 
financed on a "capitation basis." To arrange for the 
services to be performed, Petitioner will, in turn, 
contract with dentists who will receive a set monthly 
fee for their services. The plan proposed purportedly 
only obligates Petitioner to use its "best efforts" 
to arrange for dental services for the participants. 
2. The monthly fee paid to the Petitioner by the 
employer groups provides for a series of services as 
needed by the employee members where there is no pro-
portional, direct connection, as there would be if 
providers were put on a "fee for service basis," 
between the services and the monthly fee. Depending 
upon the patient's needs, more or less service may be 
provided for the same service fee. Under such an 
arrangement risk related to the cost of providing 
services ~s transferred by the terms of the employer 
contracts to petitioner and may be transferred, in 
part, by Petitioner to other dentists by provider 
contracts. 
3. The proposed plan, therefore, includes all of the 
elements normally present in an insurance transaction 
viz: (a) an ins~rable interest, (b) a risk of loss, 
especially by persons bearing similar risks, (c) .a~ . 
assumption and dispersion of the ri~k by the Pet~tioner, 
(~) a mechanism to distribute and disburse the·risk 
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of loss, and (4) payment of a permium to the Peti-
tioner for the transfer of the risk from the insured. 
The mechanism is identical to the risk assumption and 
dispersion mechanisms contemplated by Chapter 42 of 
Title 31, Utah Code Ann., as amended, which governs 
health maintenance organizations. 
4. Petitioner argues that his obligation extends 
only to tµe use of best efforts by the Petitioner and 
is not sufficient assumption of risk by the Petitioner 
to be deemed to be subject to the Utah Insurance Code. 
This argument is rejected. Instead, the Commissioner 
finds that the legislaiure iritended precisely that such 
a plan be deemed to be under the Utah Insurance Code 
to safeguard the public's interest by assuring that 
no misrepresentation, failur~ to perform or deliver, 
or other public injury occur, either under a traditional 
indemnity arrangement, or more particularly, under more 
complex and, therefore, more vulnerable direct health 
service arrangements. Moreover, if "best efforts" 
were a meaningless consideration in transferring risk 
the proposed plan could be a fraud. 
5. The proposed plan of Petitioner is an insurance 
transaction within the definition set out in the Utah 
Insurance Code Section 31-1-7 and requires, therefore, 
either the authority of a health service corporation, 
a health maintenance organization, or a health ipsurer. 
6. The plan as proposed by Petitioner furnishes 
"health care" to enrolled members within the definition 
provided in the Health Maintenance Organization Act, 
Section 31-42-3(5), Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended. 
7. The proposed operating plan falls within the 
definition of a "health maintenance organization" 
within the Utah Insurance Code, but does not propose 
to offer benefits sufficiently broad to meet the "basic 
health care services" required to qualify to receive 
a Certificate of Authority therefor. 
Order: 
1. The Plan proposed by Petitioner is governed by 
the Utah State Insurance Code and the mode of delivery 
and payment proposed is subject more particularly to 
a classification as a "Health Maintenance Organization" 
under the Utah Insurance Code. 
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2. The Petitioner cannot operate as proposed without 
a Certificate of Authority from the Utah Insurance 
Department and Petitioner would have to expand the 
proposed services to be offered to meet the basic 
health services requirement to qualify for licensure 
as a health maintenance organization." 
Dated this 27th day of March, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William G. Gibbs 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
351 South State Street· 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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foregoing Reply Brief to Messrs. John Preston Creer and 
David F. Evans, attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant at 
1100 Beneficial Life Towerj 36 South State Street, Salt 
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